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LOCATING THE EYE OF THE FINANCIAL
STORM
Jay Lawrence Westbrook *

B

ankruptcy law has become a prominent part of the effort to bring
coherence to the management of a global economic system that
operates through multinational enterprises but must function in a world
of sovereign states. 1 The very nature of bankruptcy law requires a unified
legal response to a debtor’s general default. 2 In the case of a multinational enterprise, that response requires identification of a single jurisdiction that will control, or at least coordinate, the task. Any standards chosen for specifying the primary jurisdiction will necessarily be approximate and imperfect, given the fundamental mismatch between the broad
scope of our economic institutions and the narrower reach of our political
organizations. This Article addresses recent efforts to develop workable
standards for that purpose.
I. CHOICE OF LAW AND COMI
Together, the establishment of the European Union Insolvency Regulation (E.U. Regulation) 3 and the widening adoption of the Model Law on
Cross Border Insolvency (Model Law) 4 represent a powerful trend to-

* Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business Law, The University of Texas School of
Law. I much appreciate the research assistance I have received from Erin Murdock,
Texas ‘08.
1. See generally Christoph Paulus, The Global Insolvency Law And The Role Of
Multinational Institutions, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 755 (2007).
2. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2276 (2000). In an interesting Article in this symposium, Professor Rasmussen
suggests that creditor control of bankruptcy proceedings may lead to a market solution to
coordination
of
multinational
bankruptcies.
Robert
K.
Rasmussen,
Where are all the Transnational Bankruptcies?: The Puzzling Case for Universalism, 32
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 983 (2007). He points to the absence of multiple proceedings in some
major bankruptcies as evidence. His thesis deserves serious attention. While this Article
is not a suitable vehicle for this discussion, I can point out that it seems equally interesting that so many practicing lawyers of great experience in multinational bankruptcies,
including some distinguished contributors to this symposium, seem to believe the legal
issues that we are discussing—and the choice between universalism and territorialism—
are important.
3. Council Regulation 1346/2000, Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings,
2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC).
4. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency with Guide to Enactment, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1999). The United States
version of the Model Law was adopted as Chapter 15 by the 2005 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq. (2007). The language of Chapter 15 is very
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ward universalism in the management of multinational bankruptcies. 5
Both regulations require deference to a “main” proceeding, so identification of that jurisdiction is central to their proper application. Both laws
place the main proceeding at the “the center of [the debtor’s] main interests” (COMI). The choice of principal forum in turn will have important
implications for the choice of the bankruptcy rules to be applied and
therefore the substantive outcomes for stakeholders.
COMI is similar to standards like “principal place of business,” “chief
executive offices,” or “real seat” 6 that one finds in many statutes in the
United States and elsewhere. It is not hopelessly vague, but it is clearly
subject to various interpretations. This Article addresses a fundamental
question about the interpretation of the COMI standard: what policy factors should influence the interpretation of that standard? I will argue that
the two primary factors are predictability and the likelihood of selection
of an acceptable substantive law. I will also argue that we should not
necessarily apply the same COMI standard under the Model Law and the
E.U. Regulation. Finally, I will conclude that in the current, evolving
state of the management of multinational bankruptcies, a “Dual COMI”
standard 7 is an acceptable, if imperfect, basis for the application of modified universalism.
Central to universalism in bankruptcy matters is the ideal of a single
worldwide proceeding in which one court or administrative body administers the default of a multinational corporation with the assistance of
other courts as necessary. 8 It is conceded that this ideal will not be
reached in the near future, so the notion of modified universalism has

close to that of the Model Law. H.R.REP. No. 109–31, pt. 1, at 105 (2005). Virtually everything I have to say about the Model Law is meant to apply to Chapter 15 as well.
5. I use the term “bankruptcy” in the North American way given Brooklyn’s present
location, but I mean to refer to a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding involving a business corporation.
6. See Gabriel Moss, Group Insolvency—Choice Of Forum And Law: The European
Experience Under The Influence Of English Pragmatism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1005,
1008 (2007). An excellent discussion in English of the real seat doctrine is found in Tobias Caspary, The Freedom of Establishment and the Real Seat Doctrine after the Überseering Decision of the ECJ 2003 (unpublished Article, on file with the author).
7. See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
8. See Cambridge Gas Transp. Corp. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors,
[2006] UKPC 26, [2006] 3 W.L.R. 689, para. 16 (appeal taken from the Isle of Man)
(U.K.); see also American Law Institute, Principles of Cooperation Among the NAFTA
Countries 8 (2003) [hereinafter ALI Principles]. (I had the privilege of serving as the U.S.
Reporter for the project.) For the current state of the debate between territorialism and
universalism and some interesting suggestions of a middle way, see Edward Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 819 (2007).
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been advanced to describe an approach that seeks to achieve pragmatic
results as close to the universalist ideal as possible. 9
I have long believed that in multinational bankruptcies choice of bankruptcy law and choice of bankruptcy forum are intimately related—and
should be. 10 Every aspect of any national bankruptcy law is part of an
integrated set of decisions about the policies to be served and the stakeholders to be benefited. Thus, for example, the point of the avoiding
powers found in virtually every bankruptcy law is to recover value that
was misallocated pre-bankruptcy and to redistribute it. The avoiding
powers vindicate the desire for orderly and fair distributions to the favored stakeholders in a bankruptcy proceeding. That benefit must be balanced against the cost of the disruption to markets inherent in avoidance
of transactions that are ordinarily unexceptionable. Each jurisdiction
draws that balance differently and also has different priorities in management and distribution of bankruptcy assets. 11 Thus it would rarely
make sense to void a pre-bankruptcy transaction under the bankruptcy
policies of Country A in a proceeding in which the distribution of any
avoidance recovery would be vindicating the policies of Country B. 12
That result would ill-serve the policies of both countries. B would not
avoid because of market disruption concerns, while A would give the
avoidance recovery to a different set of beneficiaries. The avoidance and
the distribution are mismatched like brown shoes with a black suit.
The close integration among bankruptcy rules and policies in each jurisdiction applies to the big four of bankruptcy policy: control, priority,
avoidance, and reorganization policy. In a system of universalism each of
9. ALI Principles, supra note 8, at 8; Janger, supra note 8.
10. See generally Janger, supra note 8, at 831; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global
Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 499 (1991). Cf. In re Board of Directors of Telecom
Argentina, S.A., No. 06 Civ. 2352NRB, 2006 WL 3378687, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20,
2006) (Trust Indenture Act satisfied by Argentinean bankruptcy procedures).
11. See, e.g., Nick Segal, The Effect of Reorganisation Proceedings on Security Interests—The Position under English and U.S. Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 927 (2007); see
generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Participation in Transnational Bankruptcies, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROY GOODE 419 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 27, 30
(1998).
12. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Avoidance of Pre-Bankruptcy Transactions in Multinational Cases, __ TEX. INT. L.J. __ (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Westbrook, PreBankruptcy] [on file with Brooklyn Journal of International Law]. But see Al Sabah v.
Grupo Torras S.A. [2005] 2 W.L.R. 904, [2005] UKPC 1. Avoidance under a nonbankruptcy avoiding power may require a different analysis. Westbrook, Pre-Bankruptcy,
supra.
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these four elements should be governed by the law of the main proceeding. 13 Under modified universalism, such centralization should be the
goal, although not always the result. I will leave the argument thus stated
without further elaboration for the purposes of this Article, but I have
spelled it out in other Articles, including one currently pending publication. 14
The immediate consequence of linking choice-of-law decisions to
COMI is to increase greatly the stakes for choosing the correct COMI. It
therefore increases the willingness of parties to litigate the COMI issue,
because the choice of forum will come ever closer to determining substantive outcomes in a Model Law-EU Regulation world. The larger implication is that this link makes it inevitable that we should be concerned
about the substantive law likely to be applied by the adoption of various
interpretations of COMI.
II. FACTORS THAT SHOULD INFLUENCE INTERPRETATION OF THE COMI
STANDARD
Two policy factors may be important in determining the best standard
for interpreting the COMI requirement: predictability and the likely quality of the substantive law of the chosen jurisdiction. Neither should be
overemphasized and no one should imagine a perfect fit from any possible rule, a goal that is as elusive in this area of the law as in all the others.
Both predictability and substantive law are important in interpreting
COMI, but they may differ in importance between the Model Law and
the E.U. Regulation, producing defensible differences in interpretation of
COMI under the two texts. I will work through the analysis of the two
factors and then discuss the Model Law-E.U. Regulation distinction.
A. Predictability
To one degree or another, creditors may rely upon the laws of a corporation’s state of incorporation or principal place of business to regulate
the management of a general default by the corporation, a point recognized in the United States as long ago as 1883. 15 It seems hard to argue
that this reliance—or potential reliance—is not important to the interpre13. Cambridge Gas Transp. Corp. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, [2006]
UKPC 26, [2006] 3 W.L.R. 689, para. 16 (appeal taken from the Isle of Man) (U.K.); In
re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1343 (English liquidators may
distribute under foreign priority schemes as part of a worldwide settlement). But see HIH
Cas. & Gen. Ins. Ltd., [2005] EWHC (Ch) 2125, [2006] All E.R. 672 (English priority
scheme must control for distributions from English assets).
14. Westbrook, Pre-Bankruptcy, supra note 12.
15. Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 537–38 (1883).
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tation of COMI, if only in a negative sense. As the United States Supreme Court said in Gebhard:
Such being the law, it follows that every person who deals with a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself to such laws of the foreign
government, affecting the powers and obligations of the corporation
with which he voluntarily contracts, as the known and established policy of that government authorizes. To all intents and purposes, he submits his contract with the corporation to such a policy of the foreign
government, and whatever is done by that government in furtherance of
that policy, which binds those in like situation with himself, who are
subjects of the government, in respect to the operation and effect of
16
their contracts with the corporation, will necessarily bind him.

However, while it seems likely that creditors rely upon the bright-line
distinction between domestic and foreign laws, it is much less clear
whether that reliance goes farther to a reliance on a specific foreign law
governing bankruptcy. Do creditors just note that some strange law may
apply or do they focus on the specific law that might govern a bankruptcy of their debtor? That question should be the subject of serious
empirical study. 17 An interim position may be more plausible: that creditors may go one step beyond the domestic-foreign distinction to rely
upon the difference between corporations organized in jurisdictions with
which the creditors are “legally comfortable” and those organized in
other jurisdictions. 18 To that extent predictability may be important. If so,
then predictability of that sort should be a major concern in identifying a
COMI.
Predictability is always in tension with correctness of result. The world
offers endless variations of the clash between competing values and policies, leaving the judge torn between the predictable result and the one
that is correct in this case or that establishes a correct rule for the future.
So, we may expect that a balance between predictability and flexibility
must be drawn with regard to COMI as well. The question remains as to
where the balance should be struck. Two recent cases mark the ends of
the spectrum—the SPhinX case establishing maximum discretion and the
Eurofood case focusing on maximum predictability.

16. Id.
17. See Part IV infra.
18. They might be legally comfortable based on fact or on prejudice, of course. In
large transactions, they might inquire closely, through lawyers, and develop real knowledge.
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1. Discretion and the Right Result Today
Maximum discretion, ignoring predictability, permits a judge to
achieve what seems to the court to be the right result, but often at a considerable cost to commercial tranquility and efficiency. A central point of
the Model Law was meant to be adoption of a structure less amorphous
than comity and a procedure more suited to bankruptcy than the ancient
machinery of judgment recognition. It was also designed quite specifically to replace the structure of U.S. Bankruptcy Code section 304, in
which section 304(c) imposed sometimes tight restrictions on cooperation based on the substance of the foreign law, 19 while drawing no distinction between primary and secondary bankruptcy proceedings in other
countries.
The new structure in the Model Law would serve several important
purposes. First, it would guide the court, while giving assurance to other
jurisdictions that decisions were not arbitrary or based on local favoritism. The uniformity of structure would serve the latter purpose by increasing the transparency of the process. The Model Law grants great
discretion as to specific relief, but imposes a fairly rigid procedural structure for recognition of foreign proceedings. It also establishes a hierarchy
of main and non-main proceedings that draws a sharp distinction between the two. COMI is a central organizing element in that hierarchical
structure. It would be a mistake to adopt an approach that adds a further
layer of discretion and that blurs even the limited amount of structure the
Model Law is able to impose.
The SPhinX case in New York carries the flexible interpretation of
COMI to an extreme. 20 The analysis in the court’s opinion offers much to
admire as to specific points, but overall it seems to virtually eliminate
predictability in determining COMI, consigning each case to the unrestrained discretion of the judge. SPhinX was incorporated in the Cayman
Islands, but had no other substantial connection with that jurisdiction—
no employees, operations, or assets. All of its directors and most, if not
all, of its creditors and investors were located elsewhere. The court found
that both objective and pragmatic considerations would locate the
debtor’s COMI outside the islands and therefore make the Caymans case
a non-main proceeding under Chapter 15. Yet the court went on to state
that in a different case it would have ignored all those factors on the sole

19. See In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001).
20. In re SPhinX, 351 B.R. 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 2007 WL 1965597
(S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2007) (The district court affirmance was published just before this Article went to press. The opinion simply approved the bankruptcy court analysis.).
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ground that the parties in interest had not objected to the Cayman proceeding and had not initiated a bankruptcy anywhere else. 21
The implicit rule seems to be that creditors and other parties in interest
may simply agree about the COMI and may be deemed to have done so
if they have not affirmatively objected, even where there is virtually no
other basis for the COMI finding. In the end, however, the court refused
main status on the ground of the bad faith motives of those who brought
the case in the Cayman Islands. 22 The court, in effect, found that its discretion as to the COMI is so complete that any good reason to deny relief
permits a finding that the foreign proceeding is non-main and the
debtor’s COMI located somewhere else.
The court’s central concern was that the Cayman proceeding was a
ploy to delay, and perhaps derail, the settlement of a claim against the
debtor in a U.S. lawsuit. 23 Recognition of the foreign proceeding as a
main proceeding would have triggered the automatic stay of section 1520
of the Bankruptcy Code. The opinion does not explain why the court
could not have avoided this difficulty simply by finding a U.S. COMI for
the company. That finding would have made the Cayman proceeding
non-main and any injunction would have been discretionary. Instead, for
reasons that are not apparent, the court went out of its way to state in dictum that a COMI could be based purely on creditor consent. It, then, refused to do so in this case on a ground wholly unrelated to the location of
the company’s main interests. 24 Even had the court held that the debtor’s
COMI was in the Cayman Islands based on creditor consent, it could still
have foiled the attempt to block the settlement simply by recognizing the

21. Id. at 120. The court noted that no other proceeding involving the debtor has been
brought and “someone needs to manage the Debtors’ winding up.” Id.
22. Id. at 121–22. Unfortunately, the district court seemed to approve specifically the
jurisdiction-by-consent holding of the bankruptcy court. 2007 WL 1965597, at *8–9.
23. The debtor had been sued for the return of an alleged preference in another bankruptcy case.
24. Cf. In re Aerovias Nacionales de Columbia S.A. (Avianca), 303 B.R. 1 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2003). In Avianca, the New York bankruptcy court permitted a Columbian
company to conduct what amounted to a main proceeding in the United States while there
was no proceeding pending in Columbia. The result rested primarily on creditor consent
and some connections with the United States. The larger question of bankruptcy jurisdiction by consent must be left to discussion on another occasion, but it seems to me that the
result is hard to square with the Model Law or Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
The Model Law COMI provision on its face does not allow consent to determine if a
foreign proceeding is a main proceeding. If that is true, it is hard to see how an adopting
state (like the United States) can justify permitting consent to make a proceeding in a
U.S. court a main proceeding when it would deny that status to a foreign proceeding in
equivalent circumstances.
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Cayman proceeding as a main proceeding and then lifting the automatic
stay on bad-faith grounds. 25
These holdings in SPhinX were the culmination of pages of analysis
that reduced the carefully crafted structure of Chapter 15 to nothing more
than a broad grant of judicial discretion. Now freed of the section 304(c)
limitations, the court’s interpretation effectively eliminates the new
structure that replaces it under the Model Law. The result is that the court
may do pretty much as it thinks best. There is no doubt that the Model
Law and Chapter 15 give the court great discretion to grant or deny relief
of various sorts, but a recognition of a proceeding and finding it to be
main or non-main also invokes provisions that must be given effect.
The SPhinX court was unwilling to accept the restraints imposed by
that structure, even though Chapter 15 has abolished the more specific
restraints previously imposed by section 304. 26 The lesson for courts in
other adopting jurisdictions will be clear: the local court may do exactly
as it pleases, thus undoing the effort to create a procedure that would
make good faith cooperation or its absence more certain and more transparent. 27 Predictability and transparency have considerable importance
and decisions such as SPhinX essentially eliminate them.
The central mechanisms of Chapter 15 are recognition of the foreign
proceeding and characterization of that proceeding as main or non-main.
The SPhinX court essentially ignores the first mechanism, yet one of the
most important changes brought by the Model Law is to centralize recognition in the bankruptcy courts using the Chapter 15 proceedings. 28 No
court is entitled to grant comity or otherwise react to a foreign bank25. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 1520(a). These sections make section 362 applicable to
the debtor and its property and therefore incorporate the grounds for lifting the stay under
section 362(d), including “cause.” H.R.REP. No. 109–31, at 114–15; United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Legislative Guide
on Insolvency, ¶ 33 (rev. 2005), available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf..
26. See In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2001) (requirements of section
304(c).
27. The court relied fairly heavily on Hoffman v. Bullmore (In re Nat’l Warranty Ins.
Risk Retention Group), 306 B.R. 614 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.), aff’d 384 F.3d 959 (8th Cir.
2004), apparently because it also involved an offshore incorporation of a company whose
objective COMI was undoubtedly in the United States. It did not note, however, that the
decision preceded the adoption of Chapter 15, and involved vigorously objecting creditors (one of them represented by the current author). The then-applicable language of the
Bankruptcy Code was much broader in identifying the debtor’s location than is COMI
under the 2005 Amendments that added Chapter 15. § 101(23) (amended) (“domicile,
residence, principal place of business, or principal assets”).
28. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 At Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713, 726–
27 (2005); see also H.R.REP. No. 109–31 (2005), at 111–12.
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ruptcy proceeding unless Chapter 15 recognition is obtained from a
bankruptcy court. 29 Conversely, every American court must grant comity
to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding once it has received Chapter 15 recognition. These provisions highlight the importance of Chapter 15 recognition as such, aside from the grant of specific relief. They are entirely
new and quite different from section 304.
The SPhinX opinion rests largely on the suggestion that Chapter 15
makes little real distinction between main and non-main proceedings. 30
With respect, that suggestion is clearly incorrect on the face of the statute. In fact, there are a number of important distinctions. For example:
1. Under section 1520, recognition of a main proceeding leads automatically to imposition of the usual stay under section 362(a). The stay
can be lifted for the usual reasons, but it springs into place as soon as the
relatively simple and relatively mechanical requirements of section 1517
have been satisfied.
2. Sections 1521(c) and 1523(b) sharply limit the relief that can be
granted to a non-main proceeding, confining it to assets that the court
specifically finds should be administered in that secondary jurisdiction.
3. Perhaps most important, recognition of a main proceeding limits any
subsequent full American bankruptcy proceeding to those assets located
in the territory of the United States, in sharp contrast to the usual worldwide effect of a United States bankruptcy. A non-main proceeding has no
such effect.
The SPhinX opinion hinted that a main/non-main finding could be
skipped altogether in an appropriate case, because cooperation between
courts is what really matters, a proposition that fails to account for the
clear language of section 1517(b)(1) that requires that the foreign proceeding be recognized as either main or non-main.
It is especially striking that the SPhinX court made almost no reference
to the legislative history of this brand new statute. By contrast, the court
in Tri-Continental discussed in detail both the U.S. legislative history
and the background legislative history contained in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide that accompanies the Model Law (Legislative Guide). 31
Instead, the SPhinX court cited U.S. Bankruptcy Code section 304 cases
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1509(c)–(d) (2005).
30. In re SPhinX, 351 B.R. 103, 114–15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 2007 WL
1965597 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2007). Under prior law, ancillary relief was limited to foreign
proceedings that were in some sense “main” by the definition of “foreign proceeding,”
but the definition provided a broad menu of choices for the primary proceeding, including
the state of incorporation if that were understood to be within the term “domicile.” See In
re Nat’l Warranty, 306 B.R. at 620.
31. In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd., 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006).
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extensively, along with the EU Regulation and Eurofood. 32 Thus a key
point of Chapter 15, the introduction of structure and uniformity, was
ignored.
2. Predictability Over All
On the other hand, too exclusive a focus on predictability is also a mistake, especially if it leads to a rule that would choose legal “havens” as
COMIs. One reading of Eurofood 33 would do just that if applied under
the Model Law. Its emphasis on the jurisdiction of incorporation might
threaten to award the COMI prize to that jurisdiction in almost every
case. 34
Eurofood has been much discussed, 35 so I will just sketch it briefly
here. Eurofood was a subsidiary of the spectacularly fallen Parmalat
group. It was incorporated in Ireland and was apparently a shell used by
Bank of America in structuring financing transactions for the Parmalat
group, having no actual employees, business, or operations. 36 The COMI
question before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 37 was whether, under the E.U. Regulation, the company’s center was its jurisdiction of incorporation, Ireland, or its alleged jurisdiction of administration, Italy. 38
The court chose the jurisdiction of incorporation with a strong emphasis
on the presumption in favor of that jurisdiction. 39 In this section of the
Article, I will discuss that sort of rule as it might be applied under the
COMI provision of the Model Law. It creates two problems in that it
both overemphasizes predictability and it too often chooses laws that are
not in fact predictable in their results.

32. In re SPhinX, 351 B.R. 103, 116–20 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 2007 WL
1965597 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2007).
33. Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFCS Ltd. v. Bank of America, N.A., 1999 E.C.R. I3813 (2006).
34. Id. paras. 34–36.
35. Samuel L. Bufford, Center of Main Interests, International Solvency Case Venue,
and Equality of Arms: The Eurofood Decision at the European Court of Justice, 27 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 351 (2007); see also Gabriel Moss & Christoph Paulus, The European
Insolvency Regulation—The Case for Urgent Reform, 19 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 1, 2
(2006); Christoph Paulus, Two Comments on Advocate General Jacobs’ Opinion in the
Eurofood
Case,
GLOBAL
TURNAROUND,
Nov.
2005,
available
at
http://www.globalturnaround.com.
36. In Star Trek terms, it was Crewman Number Six. See GALAXY QUEST (Dreamworks SKG 1999).
37. There were five questions all told.
38. Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFCS Ltd. v. Bank of America, N.A., 1999 E.C.R. I3813 (2006).
39. Id.
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The first problem with a strong incorporation presumption is that we
have little data about the extent or the mechanisms of reliance by creditors. 40 We risk giving the reliance factor much more weight than reality
justifies, thus incurring too few benefits at considerable cost. One reason
to be skeptical about creditor reliance is that we have weak laws about
disclosure of jurisdiction of incorporation. A law requiring a corporation
to disclose prominently its jurisdiction of incorporation on every piece of
paper it emitted (stationery, invoices, checks, EFT documentation, etc.)
would substantially increase the plausibility of such reliance, but I do not
believe that such a legal regime exists today in most countries. 41 I have
not seen a profile of Eurofood’s creditors, but it would be interesting to
know how many of them knew it was an Irish company. 42 Even if its
status as a financing shell meant it had no unknowledgeable creditors, the
same would not be true of cases like National Warranty in the United
States, discussed below. 43 The claimed importance of creditor reliance
rests on a shaky and undemonstrated premise of creditor knowledge and
reliance without even a strong intuition that it is true. 44
Even if creditors do know about a debtor’s jurisdiction of incorporation, companies are often incorporated in legal havens—tax havens, bank
secrecy havens, and the rest. Because I have many good friends who are
prosperous professionals living on various enchanting islands, I will discuss a fictional island called “Outlier” where the laws are attractive to the
management of corporations that are “external” or “exempted” so that
they do no real business in Outlier. 45 A strong presumption of jurisdiction of incorporation as COMI would often choose Outlier as the COMI.

40. Professor Paulus has offered a further insight into the reliance problem. He wants
to know whose reliance is relevant. See Christoph G. Paulus, Group Insolvency—Some
Thoughts About New Approaches, 42 TEX. INT’L L. J. (forthcoming 2007).
41. Better still would be an additional disclosure of the state of incorporation of the
ultimate legal-entity parent of the corporation’s corporate group.
42. Admittedly, it was a finance subsidiary, so it may not have had many non-lender
creditors.
43. Hoffman v. Bullmore (In re Nat’l Warranty Ins. Risk Retention Group), 306 B.R.
614 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.), aff’d 384 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2004).
44. A few creditors, primarily lenders, will engage in sufficiently large transactions
with debtors that they will make it a point to learn as much as possible about the debtor’s
legal location, will demand representations about the relevant facts from its officers and
principals, and will obtain covenants and even security interests that protect them against
manipulation of the location. I believe those creditors will be able to predict COMI with a
high degree of certainty in most cases under the Dual COMI approach discussed below.
45. See, e.g., In re SPhinX, 351 B.R. 103, 107, n.2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd,
2007 WL 1965597 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2007).
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Outlier may have laws that are hard to find and recent enactments may
not be published. The complex statutory analysis in the recent Al Sabah
case in the Privy Council illustrates difficulties of interpretation found in
the often untidy statutory residue left behind by the ebb of the colonial
tide. 46 The law in action in Outlier may be untransparent, except to a limited bar of local lawyers and certain elite international practitioners.
Thus, a creditor’s knowledge that a corporation is organized in Outlier
may not, in fact, produce much outcome predictability unless the creditor
is engaged in a large transaction that justifies substantial expenditures on
top-drawer legal assistance. That is, a rule that makes Outlier’s law predictably applicable may not do much to serve the ultimate purposes of
predictability. By contrast, the predictable application of British or Japanese law may be of real value. Even a creditor who does not know the
details of those laws may feel comfortable that those jurisdictions would
apply sensible and transparent bankruptcy laws to govern their commercial communities. A creditor who is sufficiently concerned can ascertain
their substance relatively easily.
B. Acceptability of the Substantive Law
The second factor that should inform interpretation of the COMI standard is the likelihood that acceptable substantive law will be chosen. I
previously summarized the arguments for application of a choice-of-law
rule that would generally select the law of the main proceeding with regard to control of assets, priorities, avoidance, and reorganization policy.
That connection makes the substantive law of the COMI important. It
seems to me that even one who does not wholly accept that argument
must concede that the substantive law of the main jurisdiction will have
an important impact on outcomes under the Model Law.
On that basis, I think it is hard to resist the proposition that the interpretation of COMI under the Model Law should, to some extent, take
account of the likely quality of the substantive law of the COMI jurisdiction. The argument in support of that proposition is similar to the case
against “contractualism,” the academic idea that parties should be allowed to adopt a binding bankruptcy law by contract. 47 A COMI that
46. Al Sabah v. Grupo Torras S.A. [2005] 2 W.L.R. 904, [2005] UKPC 1.
47. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 319–24 (1993); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 776–77 (1988); Robert K.
Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 51, 117 (1992); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1850–51 (1998). These theories have been roundly criticized. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bank-
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permits a choice of haven law is much the same as one that permits a
corporation to adopt a provision in its articles setting forth a default management system that would override an otherwise applicable bankruptcy
law, one of the leading contractualist approaches. 48 Outlier and other havens would no doubt make available just about any form of bankruptcy
that managements and certain key creditors might find attractive. One
great source of abuse with havens, of course, is that they regulate conduct that has no effect on the regulating jurisdiction or its citizens, so
they are free to accept results that no polity would be likely to permit as
applied to its own citizens or its own economy.
Bankruptcy involves many externalities not fairly or efficiently governed by contract or by a haven law. Creditors often include involuntary
creditors, like tort victims and taxing authorities, as well as maladjusting
creditors, like employees, small suppliers, and warranty-purchasing customers. 49 These creditors have little or no opportunity to understand or
make credit judgments about the substantive effects of Outlier’s laws,
including distribution priorities and protection of creditors via monitors
or creditors committees. These sorts of creditors often have no meaningful opportunity to participate in the control of the haven proceeding. The
jurisdictions where these creditors reside will bear the resulting costs.
Perhaps the most important difficulty is that Outlier is unlikely to have a
robust, fair, and transparent reorganization process designed to save jobs
and preserve communities through a financial restructuring or a sale of
assets. The lack of these opportunities will create externalities that other
jurisdictions must bear, while Outlier enjoys the professional fees associated with liquidation. 50
The point is not that we cannot tolerate differences in laws. For some
time to come, a system of modified universalism must accept differences
in policy judgments and, therefore, substantive outcomes. For example, a
U.S. court may be right to acquiesce in the nonrecovery of $100 million
in pre-bankruptcy payments, even though U.S. creditors would have

ruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (2005); Susan Block-Lieb,
The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503, 504–508; Lynn
M. LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE L.J. 317 (1999).
48. Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 1 (1997).
49. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 864, 881 (1996); Warren & Westbrook, supra note 47 (empirical study of various types of creditors).
50. See, e.g., In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 2001) (professional fees in Bahamas $8 million of $10 million estate in uncompleted case).

1032

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 32:3

benefited quite substantially from a recovery. 51 Yet, these examples produce results that fall within a range of reasonable commercial regulation
that courts and creditors in most countries can accept, given the benefits
of modified universalism and assuming a growing reciprocity. 52 The difficulty with the application of haven law is that, both formally and in
action, it is too likely to fall outside that range of acceptable outcomes. It
may also lack essential procedural characteristics, such as sufficient
transparency and an acceptable judicial system.
It seems to me unlikely that modified universalism could long survive
a COMI rule that chose Outlier and its sisters to manage a worldwide
default. It seems much more likely that courts would use public policy to
apply local law to evade the worst results, drifting back toward territorialism. If they did not, surely legislatures would do just that soon after the
first major economic downturn revealed the effects of permitting the havens to serve the dominating role. Thus, I believe that we must not adopt
a COMI rule that is likely to permit havens to serve often as the COMI of
a corporation whose headquarters and operations are elsewhere. Yet a
strong presumption in favor of jurisdiction of incorporation might have
just that effect. Thus, the most predictable rule may not be the best one
under the Model Law.
It is instructive in this regard to consider the National Warranty 53 case
in the United States. 54 National Warranty sold “extended” automobile
warranties to thousands of people across the United States. Everything
about it, except its Cayman Islands incorporation, was located in the
United States. Its principal place of business was in Nebraska, a fact
prominently stated on its contracts with American consumers. 55 It transferred all of its assets (mostly cash) to the Cayman Islands on the eve of
filing bankruptcy there. It had no other assets, operations, headquarters
personnel, or significant creditors in that jurisdiction. Yet it was permitted to obtain a section 304 injunction blocking all U.S. proceedings in
deference to a Cayman proceeding in which there was little chance for
consumers to participate. 56 The courts in that case held that the statutory
criterion of “domicile” was sufficient to require deference to a foreign
51. In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800, 818 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994),
aff’d 186 B.R. 807, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1036, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996).
52. See Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 10 at 467-68.
53. Hoffman v. Bullmore (In re Nat’l Warranty Ins. Risk Retention Group), 306 B.R.
614 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.), aff’d 384 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2004).
54. Id. I represented one of the objecting creditors in that case and therefore I am
subject to the advocate’s discount.
55. Id. at 617.
56. Id. at 622–23.
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jurisdiction based on incorporation, without more. 57 They rejected the
argument that they should interpret the statute otherwise because of the
looming adoption of Chapter 15, under which the COMI standard would
have barred recognition of the foreign proceeding as main, thus permitting a U.S. bankruptcy court to take charge of the case. 58 It is my belief
that had Chapter 15 not arrived and had there been a few more decisions
like National Warranty, a public outcry would have led to amendment of
the Bankruptcy Code to bar such results.
Finally, I can speak with some confidence about the views of those of
us who labored for some years at UNCITRAL and then worked with our
legislatures to adopt the Model Law. For the purposes of the Model Law,
the U.S. House Report is exactly correct in saying “[t]he presumption
that the place of the registered office is also the center of the debtor’s
main interest is included for speed and convenience of proof where there
is no serious controversy.” 59 Along with the other presumptions in article
1516 of the Model Law, this one permits and encourages fast action in
cases where speed may be essential, while leaving the debtor’s true “center” open to dispute in cases where the facts are more doubtful. 60 This
presumption was never discussed as a preferred alternative where there
was a separation between a corporation’s jurisdiction of incorporation
and its “real seat.” The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and the House
Report on Chapter 15 make that clear. 61
Judge Klein in Tri-Continental notes that Chapter 15 changed the
Model Law standard for overcoming the presumption in favor of the jurisdiction of incorporation. 62 The Model Law established that presumption “[i]n the absence of proof to the contrary,” but the U.S. version
states “[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary.” The legislative history explains, “[t]he word ‘proof’ in subsection (3) has been changed to
‘evidence’ to make it clearer using United States terminology that the
ultimate burden is on the foreign representative.” 63 Whatever may be the
proper interpretation of the E.U. Regulation, the Model Law and Chapter

57. Id. at 620.
58. Id. The argument appeared to have some bite given that Chapter 15 was unanimously recommended by an otherwise riven National Bankruptcy Review Commission
and supported by the leadership on both sides of the aisle in both houses. It also faced
very little opposition outside of Congress.
59. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 113 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88.
60. See In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd., 349 B.R. at 635.
61. See id.; see also In re SPhinX, 351 B.R. 103, 120, n.22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006),
aff'd, 2007 WL 1965597 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2007).
62. See In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd., 349 B.R. at 635.
63. H.R.REP. No. 109–31 (2005), at 112–13 (emphasis added).
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15 give limited weight to the presumption of the jurisdiction of incorporation as the COMI.
3. E.U. Regulation Versus Model Law
As noted earlier, the Eurofood case can be read to create a substantial
presumption in favor of the state of incorporation. 64 The argument
against such a strong presumption may not have as much force under the
E.U. Regulation as it does under the COMI provision of the Model Law,
despite their almost identical wording. The reason is that the ECJ in Eurofood emphasized the trust necessary for the functioning of the Union:
39. As is shown by the 22nd recital of the Regulation, the rule of priority laid down in Article 16(1) of the Regulation, which provides that insolvency proceedings opened in one Member State are to be recognized
in all the Member States from the time that they produce their effects in
the State of the opening of proceedings, is based on the principle of
mutual trust.
40. It is that mutual trust which has enabled a compulsory system of
jurisdiction to be established, which all the courts within the purview of
the Convention are required to respect, and as a corollary the waiver by
those States of the right to apply their internal rules on recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments in favour of a simplified mechanism
for the recognition and enforcement of decisions handed down in the
65
context of insolvency proceedings . . .

To an American ear, this rule sounds similar to the sort of trust and
deference among states dictated by the “full faith and credit” clause for
the enforcement of sister state judgments in the United States. 66 If an
E.U. court must assume that the bankruptcy laws of every other E.U.
country are reasonably transparent and within the zone of reasonable
commercial expectations, both formally and as applied, then much of the
objection to a strong incorporation presumption falls away, especially
with the ECJ’s safety-valve excluding a country of incorporation that
was merely a “letter-box” headquarters. Whether these assumptions are
justified is for others to say. But if there are no Outliers within the Union

64. See Eurofood paras. 34–36. Other cases in that court, like the Überseering decision, may suggest a movement toward jurisdiction of incorporation as an acceptable location for an E.U. corporation. See Caspary, supra note 6.
65. Eurofood paras. 39–40.
66. U.S. Const. art. IV, §1. Much the same assumption of mutual trust must underlie
the new domestic choice-of-law rule for secured transactions under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: state of incorporation is the debtor’s “location” and its laws
apply for many purposes. U.C.C. §§ 9-307.
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and if there is comfort about every possibly applicable law, then state of
incorporation might provide a highly predictable COMI without much of
the cost that might be incurred if a similar rule were applied under the
Model Law. 67
My concern is to point out that there are important differences between
insolvency cooperation among member states under the E.U. Regulation
and cooperation among countries under the Model Law. Thus, interpretations of the same COMI phrase may legitimately diverge in the two contexts, because the cost of predictability may be significantly smaller in
intra-Union insolvency cases.
III. THE DUAL COMI
Having discussed the key policy considerations in developing an interpretation of the COMI standard, we can now turn to the specific possibilities. I have a sense that in most countries, the standard for locating a
corporation on a basis other than its place of incorporation is likely to be
built on one of two concepts: the corporation’s headquarters (e.g., “chief
executive offices” or “real seat”) or its operations (e.g., “principal assets”). Each has advantages and disadvantages as a COMI standard. I
will discuss them briefly below, but the important point is that either will
usually be workable. I call the pair of them the Dual COMI. 68
If both of these standards are workable, then the Dual COMI rule can
work a marvelous result. It can reduce the possible governing bankruptcy
67. It must be acknowledged that such a rule might provoke a “race to the bottom” in
which jurisdictions attract incorporations with lax, management-favoring rules, a charge
often leveled at Delaware in the United States. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, COURTING
FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS
236–43 (2005) (venue shopping for Delaware jurisdiction); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D.
Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”, 54 VAND. L. REV. 231; Jason M. Quintana, Going Private Transactions: Delaware’s Race to the Bottom?, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 547
(2004).
68. The Federal Court of Justice has held that the COMI for an individual business
person is the place of his principal revenue generation, not his family residence. BGH IX
8/06 (June 13, 2006). The court’s guideline of the judgment, translated by Schultze &
Braun, states:
The economic activity is a certifiable criterion that guarantees legal certainty
and foreseeability of the identification of the court that is responsible for the
opening of the main insolvency proceeding for merchants, tradesman and self
employed persons. It is not significant that the debtor has his residence in Sweden and that, according to him, his wife lives there.
Email from Schultze & Braun to Jay Lawrence Westbrook (Jun. 18, 2007) (on file with
author).
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law for a multinational company from 191 countries to two. That result
should be within an acceptable range of solutions given the policies discussed above, predictability and substantive acceptability.
The first point, of course, is that often the two standards will point to
the same jurisdiction, especially for smaller corporations. Because nowadays more medium-sized companies are engaged in worldwide operations, many of these cases will be easily resolved under the Dual COMI.
National Warranty is a classic instance. 69 Under either standard, its
COMI was the United States and could not have been the Cayman Islands. The location of a COMI under the Dual COMI rule will frequently
be easy for much larger companies as well. For example, it would be
hard to argue that a Chapter 11 proceeding of the Ford Corporation in the
United States would not be the main proceeding for that company under
either standard. 70 Nonetheless there will be cases where it is plausible
that the two standards point to different jurisdictions and we must consider how the relevant policy considerations might or might not be
served by the Dual COMI.
In Part II, I discussed ignorance about the benefits of predictability.
Empirical data is needed before we adopt rules that may create serious
costs. Our lack of data is especially serious with regard to corporate
groups, because creditors in all but the largest transactions are likely to
be routinely confused about which member of the group with whom they
are dealing. Until we have more data, any solution will be problematic
with respect to corporate groups. In the meantime, it will be important to
remember that we must hold two inconsistent thoughts in our heads at all
times: we must respect the corporate form by focusing carefully on each
corporation separately, yet we must also keep one eye on the effects of a
rule on corporate groups.
To the extent that we intuit an importance to predictability, the Dual
COMI will likely yield workable results even where two jurisdictions
would qualify, because creditors are likely to have predicted that either
might be home to the corporation’s default. That will be especially true
if, as I suggest below, predictability is enhanced by placing a thumb on
the scales in favor of the headquarters standard. 71 The Maxwell case offers a good example, where the parent company’s headquarters were beyond doubt in England, but its principal assets were American subsidiar69. Hoffman v. Bullmore (In re Nat’l Warranty Ins. Risk Retention Group), 306 B.R.
614 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.), aff’d 384 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2004).
70. Admittedly, if the corporation’s North American operations collapsed while its
foreign activities continued to flourish, the two COMI indicators could diverge.
71. See Jacob Ziegel, Canada-United States Crossborder Insolvency Relations And
The Uncitral Model Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1072 (2007).
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ies. 72 A creditor would have been likely to predict England as the focus
of the management of any default by the parent, and would have been
correct in the end, but a creditor would have been foolish to ignore the
possibility that U.S. law might have an important and even dominating
effect. 73
Application of either side of the Dual COMI is likely to satisfy the acceptability criterion as well. It will be an unusual case where a plausible
argument can be made that Outlier satisfies either branch of the test, so it
will generally be true that the law to be applied in the main proceeding
will be within the range of acceptable commercial regulation. Taking
Maxwell as our example once again, the application of the legal systems
of either the United Kingdom or the United States should have been both
predictable and acceptable, even while we admit that greater certainty is
a long-term goal to be pursued.
Judge Klein’s opinion in Tri-Continental illustrates these points. 74 It is
a model application of Chapter 15 that I would commend to every judge
facing a COMI problem for the first time. The caveat is that it was a case
apparently riddled with fraud from the very inception of the business, 75
so it may not be fully applicable in the more usual case. 76 In that case,
the insurance company debtors were incorporated in St. Vincent and the
Grenadines (SVG). 77 All of their customers and creditors were in the
United States, but they had no presence in this country. 78 All of their
twenty employees were in SVG. Fraud was the business, and it was done
entirely in the islands. 79 All of their sales appear to have been through
independent distributors in the United States or on the Internet. 80
In the end, the court recognized the SVG liquidation as the main proceeding in the face of opposition from one substantial U.S. creditor that
72. In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800, 818 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994),
aff’d 186 B.R. 807, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1036, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996); see
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Duty to Seek Cooperation in Multinational Insolvency
Cases, in THE CHALLENGES OF INSOLVENCY LAW REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY, (Peter,
et al. eds., 2006), reprinted in ANN. REV. OF INSOLVENCY LAW 2004 (Janis Sarra ed.,
2005).
73. Presumably, the European banks would have taken their $100 million prebankruptcy payment anyhow and hoped for the best in any preference litigation.
74. In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd., 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006).
75. See id. at 630–31.
76. Enron, for example, was a legitimate company for many years before lapsing into
fraud.
77. In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd., 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. Their U.S. activities seem to reflect a complete breakdown of regulation.
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claimed a lien on certain funds in the United States. 81 Rather than yielding to the temptation to find the COMI in the United States, the court
reacted to the interests of that creditor by recognizing the foreign proceeding as main, but then carefully examining the relief to be granted to
ensure that the creditor was “sufficiently protected.” 82 The court noted
that, because that the SVG liquidators were not seeking turnover, the
creditor would have an opportunity to show the validity of its lien and
demand section 363(c)(2) protections if the lien was upheld. 83 Thus, it
could protect its interests, while the liquidators would have access to
cash necessary to finance a plausible search for assets.
Although this case may look like a victory for the Outlier-type of jurisdiction, in fact the business of this company was carried out in SVG,
unlike the business of National Warranty or SPhinX, a point not unrelated to the fraudulent nature of the business and the lack of proper U.S.
regulation. In that regard, it is a bit of a sport. 84 However, even under
these unusual circumstances, the foreign proceeding was in fact the main
proceeding. The choice of SVG for that role would have been highly
predictable, if the facts were known, and if anything can be said to be
predictable to the victims of fraud. The case also illustrates the flexibility
of Chapter 15: permitting the court to allow the case to be administered
in another jurisdiction, while taking care to protect creditors if necessary.
Thus, if the law of SVG should prove to create results outside of a broad
range of commercial acceptability (not merely a result different from
U.S. law), the court makes it clear that it is amply empowered to act protectively.
This discussion leaves open the question which of the Dual COMI
should be applied, headquarters or operations? I am inclined to prefer the
headquarters, but not exclusively. While I will not attempt to develop the
analysis fully in this Article, I will note a few of the considerations that
might be thought important pending the development of the necessary
data.

81. Id.
82. See In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd., 349 B.R. at 639–40; see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 1522(a) (“The court may grant relief . . . only if the interests of the creditors and other
interested entities, including the debtor, are sufficiently protected.”). The House Report
explains that the term in Chapter 15 was changed from the Model Law’s “adequately
protected” to avoid confusion with the well-established, narrower use of the latter term in
American law. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(Part I) (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88.
83. In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd., 349 B.R. at 639; Bankruptcy Code
§363(c)(2).
84. As pointed out earlier, most often an Outlier-type of jurisdiction requires that the
company do no business within its borders. See supra text accompanying notes 45–46.
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The headquarters choice of COMI will often be fairly predictable, especially for the benefit of lenders and other large creditors, and particularly when operations of a multinational are located in a number of jurisdictions. That will be true when the corporation in question is not part of
a corporate group, is the parent of a corporate group, or is the only active
member of a corporate group. As Gabriel Moss’ insightful Article points
out, in any of those circumstances, the headquarters rule offers a further
advantage in permitting centralization of a corporate group in one
court. 85 Given that some method of centralization seems essential to developing a coherent response to the default of a multinational group, that
advantage to the headquarters rule is an important one. 86
On the other hand, a headquarters rule will often be more manipulable
than an operations rule. Some courts may feel free to disregard such manipulation, but others will not. Having an operations rule available will
protect against manipulation and reduce the incentive to manipulate. This
rule will also allow for the less common case where the operational center of a debtor company will actually have been much more visible to
creditors than its headquarters. For these reasons, there is a case to be
made for having a Dual COMI. As long as a headquarters rule is preferred, the loss of predictability arising from a dual standard will be
greatly mitigated, especially since the operations standard is most likely
to be applied in the unusual case when the headquarters rule is less predictable.
An independent ground of concern about a headquarters rule is that it
will often prefer a developed country to a developing one, creating a risk
of resistance by the latter to the creation of a universalist system. Although the problem should not be ignored, the COMI rule is just one of a
hundred legal issues that create this policy tension. On balance, application of a Dual COMI rule with a preference for the headquarters standard
is a good pragmatic choice for a court committed to modified universalism.
IV. AN EMPIRICAL AGENDA
The legal academy is leaving behind the tradition of making policy arguments that rest largely on intuition and anecdote. Increasingly, we are
85. Moss, supra note 6.
86. A Working Group of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
is currently addressing the problem of corporate groups in the context of insolvency.
UNCITRAL Working Group V, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission
/working_groups/5Insolvency.html (last visited June 6, 2007). Centralization is to be
sharply distinguished from “consolidation,” where the corporations in the group are
treated as one debtor. That is a much more serious and rare phenomenon.
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demanding evidence, which, as lawyers, we should have thought to do all
along. If we argue that a certain rule is more advantageous because of
buyers’ expectations and because sellers rely on certain facts to price
their goods, we want to know that those factual assumptions have some
basis. Of course, judgments have to be made pending empirical study,
but we are disciplining ourselves to be tentative and unsatisfied until we
have more confidence in our facts. One corollary is that an Article like
this one ought to, at a minimum, set for an agenda for empirical research.
The central requirement is for more information about the degree to
which creditors take into account the legal impact of a counterparty’s
home country in an international transaction. Do they attempt to ascertain that fact and even to try to protect against a change of COMI? Do
they ignore it and hope to win a battle of forms? Do they use security
interests or corporate structures to protect themselves against the risk of a
bad choice of forum and choice of law? Or is insolvency such a lowprobability event that they ignore it or lump it into their pricing along
with hurricanes and expropriations? Do their present practices suggest
methods by which a predictable and acceptable COMI could be fashioned from some pre-default system of registration or notice? What are
the circumstances of different sorts of creditors (large companies, SAMI
companies, consumers, involuntary creditors) in all these regards?
V. CONCLUSION
The two factors that should inform our understanding of the proper interpretation of the COMI standard in the EU Regulation and the Model
Law are predictability and the likely quality of the chosen substantive
law. In both respects, we can be content for now with a standard that is
reasonably predictable and that produces reasonably acceptable substantive outcomes. The Dual COMI standard—with a preference for the
headquarters alternative—does both. Additionally, despite having the
same standard in both the EU Regulation and the Model Law, it is plausible that it will be permissible to interpret them somewhat differently.
The reason is the predictability can safely be given more weight in the
EU on the assumption that all member states have laws and procedures
within the acceptable range and none of them are havens.
The traditional idea was that a journey of a thousand miles begins with
a single step. We are several miles into our thousand-mile endeavor to
unify and improve one important aspect of globalization, the management of the general default of a multinational corporation. It is a trip
well-begun and the prospects for adventure are enticing.

